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Climate justice accounts for the most challenging global governance goal. In the current post-
COP21 Paris agreement climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, the financialization 
of the ambitious goals has leveraged into a blatant demand.  In the weighting of the burden of 
global warming, the benefits of a warming earth have been neglected since recently.  Following 
the introduction of the gains from climate change (Puaschunder, 2017), this article proposes a 
model to distribute the benefits of a warming earth in a fair way based on which countries are 
losing and which countries are winning from a warming earth until 2100.  A macroeconomic 
cost-benefit analysis thereby aids to find the optimum solution on how to distribute climate 
change benefits and burden within society.  When unidimensionally focusing on estimated 
GDP growth given a warmer temperature, over all calculated models assuming linear, prospect 
or hyperbolic gains and losses, the world will be gaining more than losing from a warming earth 
until 2100.  Based on the ܹܮ index of 188 countries of the world, less countries (n=78) will 
gain more from global warming until 2100 than more countries (n=111) will lose from a warming 
earth.  Based on the overall ܹܮ்் index factored by GDP per inhabitant, global warming 
benefits are demanded to be redistributed in a fair way to offset the costs of climate change 
loser countries for climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts and to instigate a transition 
into renewable energy.  Adding onto contemporary climate fund raising strategies ranging from 
emissions trading schemes (ETS) and carbon tax policies as well as financing climate justice 
through bonds as viable mitigation and adaptation strategies, climate justice is introduced to 
comprise of fairness between a countries but also over generations in a unique and 
unprecedented tax-and-bonds climate change gains and losses distribution strategy.  Climate 
change winning countries are advised to use taxation to raise revenues to offset the losses 
incurred by climate change.  Climate change losers could raise revenues by issuing bonds that 
have to be paid back by taxing future generations.  Regarding taxation, within the winning 
countries, foremost the gaining GDP sectors should be taxed.  Climate justice within a country 
should also pay tribute to the fact that low- and high income households share the same burden 
proportional to their dispensable income, for instance enabled through a progressive carbon 
taxation.  Those who caused climate change could be regulated to bear a higher cost through 
carbon tax in combination with retroactive billing through inheritance tax to map benefits from 
past wealth accumulation that potentially contributed to global warming.  Deriving respective 
policy recommendations for the wider climate change community in the discussion of the 
results is aimed at ensuring to share the burden but also the benefits of climate change within 
society in an economically efficient, legally equitable and practically feasible way.     
 
Key words: Climate Change, Climate Change Bonds, Climate Change Gains, Climate Change 
Losses, Climate Justice, Europe, Macroeconomic Modelling, Tax-Bonds-Transfer Strategy, 
Taxation, United States, World 
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1. Introduction 
Climate justice has been discussed in the focal point of law, economics and 
governance (Puaschunder, 2016c).  The implementation of climate stability accounts for the 
most challenging contemporary global governance predicament that seems to open an abyss 
of world inequality regarding differing times and degrees to enjoy benefits of a warming earth 
around the globe (Puaschunder, 2017).  As a novel angle towards climate justice, this article 
proposes a well-balanced climate gains global governance distribution based on micro-, meso, 
and macroeconomic analyses results.   
Overall the following paper investigates the nature of climate justice imbalances from 
an economic and a legal perspective in order to ensure economic justice solutions for 
advancing global climate stability.  The structure of increasingly fragile environmental 
conditions will be captured in order to derive real-world relevant implications how to improve 
the overall global environmental conditions for humankind on a global scale but also over time.  
Through the understanding of climate change gains and losses, climate gain redistribution 
strategies will be presented.  Shedding light on fair global warming gains distribution is meant 
to aid market economies to be brought to a path consistent with prosperity and sustainability.   
A preliminary literature review revealed a missing focus on climate change gains 
(Puaschunder, 2017). Holistic global systemic risk analysis centered around fragility of the 
global environmental systems dominate the focus of contemporary climate justice discussions.  
Addressing these biases in order to gain a holistic climate change picture, innovatively the 
gains of a warming mother earth were recently measured in order to prepare for a well-
tempered climate stability policy mix recommendations financed through a right, just and fair 
global warming gains distribution strategy (Puaschunder, 2017).   
The following paper combines theoretical and empirical research to review climate 
change gains in order to propose a right, just and fair strategy to implement climate justice 
around the globe.  Outlining the benefits of a warming earth raises the demand for a fair asset 
allocation in order to offset the costs arising from climate change mitigation and adaptation 
strategies around the world. The paper thereby targets at gaining an in-depth understanding 
of how to alleviate climate change risks and implement climate change stability in the 
international arena by the help of fair global warming benefits distribution.  Theoretical legal 
arguments capturing international climate stability mandate interdependencies are thereby 
innovatively coupled with quantitative global warming asset analyses in order to retrieve a fair 
and feasible climate stability implementation proposal.  The overall goal of the paper is to 
develop our understanding of climate stabilization through the analysis of global warming 
gains distribution. Legal studies as well as economic calculus enhanced will produce public 
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policy recommendations following the greater goal of developing a multidisciplinary analysis 
of global climate alleviation.  
The paper is organized as follows: After a climate stability risk overview (Part 1.2), a 
qualitative legal analysis aims at gaining climate change benefits and burden sharing 
strategies.  Quantitative modelling of global warming gains focus on finding a fair distribution 
of global warming gains based on international climate interdependencies (Part 2.).  Global 
warming benefits transfers will be proposed on a global and temporal scale in the discussion 
of an unprecedented tax-and-bonds-transfer strategy.  In its entirety, the paper offers a unique 
combination of the laws and economics of global warming gains including a nomenclature 
creation, literature reviews and quantitative modeling in order to derive public policy directions 
for global governance experts and institutions pursuing a real-world relevant worldwide fair 
climate stability strategy.  
2. Climate change 
Climate change accounts for one of the most pressing problems in the age of 
globalization as for exacerbating more complex risks than ever before.  As never before in 
history since the birth of the earth, there is an environmental sensitivity to economic growth 
(Centeno & Tham, 2012; The World Economic Forum Report, 2015).  While classic economics 
portrayed balancing the interests of different generations as ethical problem of competitive 
markets requiring governance for intergenerational transfers and some economists even 
opposed discounting of future utilities (Allais, 1947; Harrod, 1948; Puaschunder, 2015a; 
Ramsey, 1928); climate change has leveraged intergenerational equity as contemporary 
challenge of modern democracy and temporal justice an ethical obligation for posterity 
(Puaschunder, 2016e, 2017).   
Global warming has become reality in temperature anomalies, extreme weather 
events, unprecedented hurricane seasons and up to 50 inches sea level rise predicted until 
the end of the century.  History has also been made in reaching an iconic agreement on global 
warming mitigation at the UN Paris climate change conference.  Literature on the topic centers 
around the economics of climate change, on causes of climate change, mitigation policies – 
such as cap and trade and carbon taxation – regulatory measures, and on adaptation.  
Substantive climate coverage through the IPCC research but also international conferences 
on climate change and global warming abatement stress the currently most urgent need for 
climate change mitigation and adaptation policies.  The most recent research attempts 
address in particular the funding a burden sharing of climate policies in the international 
compound raising challenging questions about the burden sharing inbetween countries and 
over generations.  
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2.1 Climate justice between countries 
 The legal argumentation about climate stability touches on different fields of law, 
ranging from common goods to private property to human rights.  While climate was 
historically understood as a common good,1 which is non-excludable and non-rivalrously 
shared and beneficial for all world members, this original perception is currently challenged by 
climate change.  If climate becomes less stable, climate may not be considered as common 
good any more.  For instance, if climate instability impacts certain world areas by weather 
extremes – such as sea level rise, flooding, droughts, desert formation, storms, and hurricanes 
– more severe than other parts of the world that may even benefit from a warmer climate (e.g., 
consider Russia’s and Canada’s access to natural resources when ice is melting in their 
Northern territories), a quest for living in a beneficial area of the world may leverage a favorable 
climate as a quasi-luxury.  Living in a part of the world with a beneficial climate may become 
an exclusive privilege that is rivalrously contested.  Under these circumstances, climate would 
not be considered as classical common good.  But also take the example of rising sea levels.  
If climate gets warmer, sea levels rise and drown landscape under water, the common good 
of climate directly impacts on private property.  Predictions of Venice disappearing and 
Manhattan being almost by half under water in 200 years2 if we continue on a business-as-
usual path, underline the direct impact of the common good climate on private property rights.  
If temperature rises, private property will be destroyed or more expensive to maintain than 
before.  
 Climate justice concerns thereby directly touch on human rights (Puaschunder, 2016c, 
2017).  The greater goal of ensuring climate justice is that not one generation creates 
irreversible lock-ins for future generations.  The claim for a human right of access to a stable 
climate stems from intergenerational fairness demands, which is a natural behavioral law or a 
human-imbued cue that has been practiced ever since (Puaschunder, 2011).  Climate justice 
is thereby traced in human rights and sustainable development is a quest to safeguard the 
rights of those affected by climate change.  Connecting a stable climate to human rights has 
become a blatant demand in the light of a changing sea levels.  Yet to this day, climate 
refugees are not treated under the Geneva Convention3 as long as their rights are not directly 
connected to a human right.  From the Arctic to the Indian Ocean to the South Pacific, small 
island states and coastal lines have therefore nowadays become home to the most vulnerable 
communities, whose rights are not fully protected by contemporary legal frameworks.  The 
threat of rising sea levels in the wake of climate change pushes populations to relocate to 
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safer areas. Contemporary legal frameworks do not recognize and protect the rights of these 
novel climate migrants as climate refugees do not fall under Geneva Convention4 protectorate 
as long as climate justice is not considered an eternal human law and right.  Climate justice 
may thus be leveraged as a human right in the years to follow.  Subsequent legislation should 
set out to ensure a decent standard of living of those affected by global climate warming.   As 
the destabilization of climate will directly destroy, damage or intensify maintenance costs of 
private property and a decent living; the climate stabilization efforts therefore also have 
entered private property and standard of living financialization considerations.    
 In the financing of climate stabilization, private market rational have been proposed 
following World Bank and United Nations approaches to price natural resources.  These 
financialization and commodification of nature efforts, however, have just started.  In the 
commodification of climate, economic rational should be applied but with the caution of legal 
oversight.  The basic economic rules of supply and demand suggest that an over-demand of 
climate elevates the price of a stable climate.  Legal rational following the quest for justice 
between countries subsumes the rising price of a stable climate to those countries that benefit 
more from a stable climate, should also be paying a higher price for climate stabilization.  Fair 
climate change burden sharing between countries could therefore comprise of two 
argumentations:  First, those countries who benefit more from a stable climate, hence those 
with a larger landscape or higher population, who have more access to climate than others 
and hence a greater summed up utility over all their individual nationals derived from a stable 
climate, should also bear a higher degree of the burden of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation efforts.  Second, those countries who benefit more from global warming and reap 
benefits from a warmer earth temperature should redistribute some of the wealth accumulation 
due to climate change to offset the costs arising from global warming at other countries of the 
world that suffer from a decline in living conditions due to rising temperatures.   
 The legal foundation for different country approaches toward climate mitigation and 
adaptation cost sharing can be found at the heart of sustainability having been declared as 
one in which countries have ‘common but differentiated responsibilities,’5 which was first 
discussed in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration at the first Rio Earth Summit in 1992.6  New to 
this argument, however, is that the benefits of global warming – which are real and exist, for 
instance, in melting ice allowing unprecedented access to below surface resources and larger 
arable landscape – should be shared globally to offset costs and harms produced from a 
higher temperature in other parts of the world.  In addition, building on case and international 
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law, those countries that have better means of protection or conservation of the common 
climate should also face a greater responsibility to protect the earth.  The legal basis for this 
argument stems from an inverted subsumption of the argumentation whether climate stability 
is a common good or impacts on private property and draws on historical cases of legally-
justified expropriation.   
 Private property rights are some of the starkest legal claims existent around the world.  
Private property rights hold through time, distance and space.  If a neighbor goes on vacation, 
one cannot simply move in his home and claim oneself as new owner.  But there is one 
interesting case in history, where private property rights could be neglected for the sake of 
common goods.  In history, the private property claim of a country was legally-justified 
negligible if (1) those who owned a good were not alive anymore and direct attribution of the 
owner non-existent; (2) the former private property was turned into a common good; and (3) 
the new owner had better means of protection and conservation than the good had 
experienced before.   
 Take historical examples such as the Stone of Rosetta but also other cases such as 
the ‘Elgin’ Parthenon Marbles as part of the Athenian Acropolis (Downs, 2008).  Historically 
the stone of Rosetta was discovered by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1799 in the small town of 
Rosetta in Egypt, and is now exhibited in the British Museum for more than 200 years.  There 
are several arguments for not restituting former private property to the countries of their origin 
as in the case of the Stone of Rosetta: (1) The actual former owner are not alive anymore and 
unknown, which naturally transposes any direct individual property claim to the international 
law domain, hence the country Egypt contests the country Great Britain over ownership and 
possession. Great Britain claims (2) to turn the former private property to a common good 
through granting a large and diverse group of people access, hence creating a larger summed 
up utility.   London – as a vibrant metropolitan hub with a vast array of visitors – is a better 
stage to explain the meaning of the stone to a broader public than if the stone were still in 
Rosetta, a small town near Alexandria in Egypt.  The display of the stone in a museum adds 
additional value: (3) The British Museum has better means of protection, preservation and 
conservation of the stone than if it were displayed by itself in a desert town benefiting not only 
from the political stability of Great Britain but also the strong culture of heritage awareness 
and valuation as a Royal mandate.  (4) The surrounding in a museum grants the stone 
meaning and a Gestalt bringing to life the mysteries of the ancient Egypt and the stone’s 
importance as a historical artefact in deciphering Greek, Hieroglyphs and demotic Egyptian 
(Downs, 2008).  The stone’s connection to history truly becomes apparent in the wealth of 
other displayed objects that grant the stone a certain collective Gestalt bestowing upon it an 
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additional value.  The sum of objects in a museum is worth more in its entirety than its sole 
pieces standing alone.  
 What can we learn from the historic case of expropriation for the future of climate 
justice?  Instead of asking whether ancient colonial claims have still today the right to retain 
misplaced cultural heritage, these standard argumentations for expropriation – on which the 
justification for these items to remain in former colonial powers’ territories to this day lies – 
could be subsumed to the novel and contemporary case of climate justice.  In the arguments 
whether the first and the second world should bear the same burden of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation efforts brought up foremost by China arguing to have a right to 
economic growth by the same – unfortunately climate-change causing – means of economic 
transition as the first world had in previous centuries7, one could subsume from the above 
case of expropriation for the sake of common goods creation:  (1) That climate change will 
potentially infringe on private property rights of future owner who are currently unknown.  (2)  
Those countries should bear a higher burden of climate change mitigation and adaptation 
efforts, who have more access to climate, hence those with larger gains from a warming earth 
but also a larger landscape and/or those with a larger population; (3) but also those countries 
who have better means of protection, preservation and conservation, hence the first world or 
GDP strong countries, have to take on a greater responsibility in averting climate change 
(Puaschunder, 2016c, 2017). (4) Overall, there is a natural Gestalt over time regarding climate.  
Over time, the sum of a stable climate over time is more precious than the individual 
generation’s costs incurred to maintain a favorable climate.  Shedding light at these 
deficiencies underlines the need for considering climate justice a natural law over time that 
connects our common humankind’s past to our future (Puaschunder, 2016d, 2017).  
2.2 Climate justice between generations 
Society as a whole outlasts individual generations.  Pareto optimality for society over time 
differs from the aggregated individual generations’ preferences.  As the sum of individual 
generations’ preferences does not necessarily lead to societally favorable outcomes over time 
(Bürgenmeier, 1994; Klaassen & Opschoor, 1991), discounting based on individual 
generations’ preferences can lead to an unjust advantage of living generations determining 
future living conditions.  In the climate domain, intertemporal questions arise whether to invest 
in abatement today – in order to prevent negative effects of global warming – or to delay 
investment until more information on climate change is gained (Rawls, 1971).  In general, 
resources are balanced across generations by social discounting to weight the well-being of 
future generations relative to those alive today.  Regarding climate justice, current generations 
                                                 
7 http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/views-on-china-and-copenhagen/?_r=0 
Climate in the 21st Century 
 
 
 page 9 of 25 
are called upon to make sacrifices today for future generations to cut carbon emissions to 
avert global warming (Sachs, 2014).  In general, intergenerational balance is therefore 
accomplished through individual saving decisions of the present generation (Bauer, 1957).  
Policies curbing preferences and taxes distributing welfare between the present and future 
generation, however, decreases economic growth.  But this climate change mitigation at the 
expense of lowered economic growth creates intergenerational predicaments.  Costly climate 
change abatement prospects are currently hindering necessary action on climate change 
given a shrinking time window prior to reaching tipping points that make global warming 
irreversible (Oppenheimer, O’Neill, Webster & Agrawal, 2011; Puaschunder, 2016a, 2017).    
 As an innovative angle in this debate of economic growth versus sustainability that pits 
the current generation against the future, a novel climate change mitigation approach with 
bonds funded through debt and taxation imposed on future generations is proposed.  In order 
to avoid governmental expenditure on climate change hindering economic growth but also to 
instigate immediate action on climate change abatement (Barro, 1990); Sachs (2014) 
introduced to fund today’s climate mitigation through an intertemporal fiscal policy mix backed 
by climate bonds and carbon tax (Marron & Morris, 2016).  Bonds are debt investment in which 
investors loan money to an entity, which borrows the funds for a defined period of time at a 
variable or fixed interest rate.  Bonds are primarily used by companies, municipalities, states 
and sovereign governments to raise money and finance a variety of future-oriented long-term 
projects and activities.  In this debt investment strategy, investors loan money to an entity, 
which borrows the funds for a defined period of time at a variable or fixed interest rate 
(Puaschunder, 2016c).  A climate bonds financing could subsidize the current world industry 
for transitioning to green solutions as a real-world relevant means to tap into the worldwide 
USD 80 trillion-bond market in order to fund the incentives to a transition to a sustainable path 
(Puaschunder, 2016b; World Bank, 2015).    
 Carbon tax can also help financing a well-tempered climate change mitigation and 
adaptation mix as carbon taxes can raise substantial revenue until the economy is largely 
decarbonized (Marron & Morris, 2016). In Sachs (2014) 2-period model, climate change 
mitigation is financed by debt to be repaid by tax revenues on labor income in the future.  
Leaving the current generation with unchanged disposable income allocates the burdens of 
climate change mitigation across generations without the need to trade off one generation’s 
well-being for another’s.  While today’s young generation is left unharmed, the second period 
young generation is made better off ecologically.  Taxes on later generations are justified as 
for the assumed willingness of future generations to avoid higher costs of climate change 
prevention and environmental irreversible lock-ins.  Shifting the ultimate costs of climate 
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change aversion to later generations leverages climate stability into a Pareto improving 
strategy for mankind.    
 Overall, in this tax-and-transfer mitigation policy all generations are better off with 
mitigation through climate bonds as compared to the business-as-usual (BAU) non-mitigation 
scenario (Sachs, 2014).  While future generations enjoy a favorable climate and averted 
environmental lock-ins; the current populace does not face drawbacks on economic growth.  
Sharing the costs of climate change aversion between and across generations appears as 
powerful strategy to instigate immediate climate change mitigation through incentivizing 
emission reduction and provide adaptation.  Although intergenerational burden sharing on 
climate change appears as viable real-world relevant emergent risk prevention; we currently 
lack an analytical understanding of the impact of climate mitigation through bonds on 
economic growth, the coordinated implementation of climate change burden sharing bonds as 
well as the model’s long-term effects.    
A literature review and preliminary studies have to be undertaken on the current 
discussion on sustainable finance and the diverse methods of funding of mitigation and 
adaptation policies.  Particular emphasis was given to the already existing literature, 
experiences and practices of issuing climate bonds and its relation to carbon tax 
(Puaschunder, 2017).  The issue of sustainable financing of climate policies was found to be 
less developed.  Regarding creative financing strategies, a focus group was staged during 
August 2016 at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg 
Austria with 39 young scientists representing diverse disciplines, well-balanced gender 
composition and differing nationalities from around the globe (Puaschunder, 2016c).  The 
focus group revealed primary interests in the novel climate change bonds financing strategy 
(Puaschunder, 2016c).  Questions were raised about the legal and policy frameworks to enact 
the bonds; feasibility, efficiency and pricing of bonds; multi-dimensionality and incentive 
concerns of the general bond financing strategy idea; international differences in climate 
change mitigation and adaptation attempts as well as justice between countries to share the 
benefits and burdens of global warming equally.  In addition, several sustainable development 
financing approaches were discussed during the 2016 Alpbach Retreat comprising of open 
source investment platforms, innovative public-private partnership plans as well as self-
financing tools to create constant revenue streams to settle expenses long-term 
(Puaschunder, 2016a).   
Uncertainty arising in assessing economic growth in relation to climate change creates 
an unprecedented predicament for scientists and global governance technocrats.  
International questions are posed as to which countries should be paying to invest in 
abatement today – in order to prevent negative effects of global warming around the globe 
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(Rovenskaya, 2008).  In general, resources are balanced across the globe by social 
discounting to weight the overall well-being.  Regarding climate justice, current climate change 
beneficiaries are called upon to make sacrifices today to cut carbon emissions to avert global 
warming (Sachs, 2014).  The implementation of climate change avoidance, and the adaptation 
against the coming climate risk was previously described as to pit today’s climate change 
winners and losers against each other in the trade-off of economic growth versus sustainability 
(Puaschunder, 2016b, 2017; Sachs, 2014).   
In this framing, the problem of climate change is therefore mainly associated with risks 
and burden sharing costs, which may have caused a lethargy on action (Puaschunder 2016a).  
Climate change burden sharing strategies have been thermalized alongside mitigation and 
adaptation policies against climate risks (Puaschunder 2016b).  Recent IPCC research, 
international conferences on climate change and fund raising activities to combat global 
warming stress that it is advisable now to pursue both mitigation as well as adaptation.  While 
climate justice will require both, climate change gains and losses should be analyzed 
concurrently (Puaschunder, 2017).  Yet, no macroeconomic model exists to date on the 
transfers of global warming benefits a warming earth will bring in the short term to areas that 
need funding to offset the losses of climate change. 
2.3 Research question 
The empirical part features a stylized model to introduce intergenerational burden sharing 
financed through distributing the contemporary global warming gains around the world.  The 
discussion will then focus on the actual implementation of climate justice through the idea of 
issuing climate bonds coupled with a taxation solution.  Empirical analyses will help revealing 
the model’s viability in order to derive suggestions for global governance policy makers to 
efficiently herald climate justice in the 21st century.  
Shedding unprecedented light on the advantages of global warming will help to retrieve 
real-world relevant climate justice implementation recommendations.  Contrary to negative 
connotations of burden sharing on climate change, outlining the benefits of global warming 
will draw attention from agnostic market actors.  As a positive incentive, gains raise awareness 
for the issue at stake and ensure that the positive advantages of a warming earth can be 
distributed based on right, just and fair ethical principles.  Without knowledge and 
quantification of the gains of climate change, climate inequality may become unnoticed 
(Chancel & Piketty, 2015).  Only by the sound understanding of who will gain what on a 
warming earth, justice can be established – as to the entire world benefitting from the gains of 
a warming globe in a just way.  Knowledge of the concrete benefits based on contemporary 
finance and growth models maximizing utility over the world can thereby lead the 
implementation of climate justice between countries but also over time.  The measurement 
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and description of the short-term winners and losers of a warming earth is an innovative and 
novel angel towards accomplishing climate justice that is introduced in order to find a 
behavioral economics solution to steer action through positive incentives.  The following 
empirical part therefore elucidates climate change gains around the world in order to find right, 
just and fair benefit sharing strategies and mechanisms, which will be proposed in the following 
discussion section based on a tax-and-bonds diversification strategy.   
As the very first preliminary attempt in the benefits distributions direction, the article 
provides real-world relevant means how to implement climate justice on a global and long-
term scale.  Outlining the distribution of benefits of climate change is key in determining 
redistribution strategies for vulnerable cities, communities and countries to protect them from 
the variegated climate change risks (Nordhaus, 1994). The prospective results of a climate 
change gains analysis will therefore help multivariate stakeholders achieving compensation 
for climate change mitigation, adaptation and a transition into renewable energy for 
sustainable development.  The climate model helps analyze how global governance experts 
can distribute the gains of a warming earth around the globe.  Winking with insights on the 
benefits of climate change appears as novel, feasible and easily-implementable solution to 
gain interest from the very many contemporary stakeholders we need to address the issue of 
a warming earth but also nudging overlapping generations towards future-oriented 
sustainability follows the greater goal to make the world a fairer place in the access to stable 
climate for this generation and the following.   
3. Method 
3.1 Overall model assumptions 
Building on Puaschunder (2017) economic output was measured under projected 
conditions of a warming earth.  For 189 world countries the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
agriculture, industry and service sector composition was retrieved from the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) World Factbook.8  Contemporary climate change projections estimate a mean 
temperature rise of approximately 4.24 degrees Celsius.  The cardinal temperature ܥ	per GDP 
sector was related to the prospected temperature in 2100 per country.  From the current world 
temperature mean per country and the estimate of a 4.25-degree Celsius climate change until 
2100, the closeness to cardinal temperature per sector was calculated for each country by 
using the following formula 3.1: 
஺ܶ ൌ ܥ஺ െ ௘ܶ           (3.1) 
                                                 
8 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
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Whereby ஺ܶ represents the closeness to the optimum cardinal temperature for 
agriculture calculated by the cardinal temperature for agriculture ܥ஺, which equals to 28.5 
degrees Celsius, subtracted by ܶ ௘ as the temperature estimated for the year 2100 per country.  
The result for the distance to the optimum temperature for each sector for each country was 
then multiplied by the GDP contribution percentage of the sector using the following formula 
3.2-3.4: 
For the agricultural sector, formula 3.2 reads 
ܹܮ஺ ൌ ஺ܶ ∗ ܩܦ ஺ܲ,          (3.2) 
whereby ܹܮ஺ stands for the climate change winner and loser index for agriculture per 
country comprised of the distance to the optimum cardinal temperature per GDP sector ஺ܶ 
multiplied by the percentage of agriculture contributing to the overall GDP indicated by ܩܦ ஺ܲ. 
For the industry sector, formula 3.3 reads 
ܹܮூ ൌ ூܶ ∗ ܩܦ ூܲ,          (3.3) 
whereby ܹܮ஺ stands for the climate change winner and loser index for industry per 
country comprised of the distance to the optimum cardinal temperature per GDP sector ூܶ 
multiplied by the percentage of industry contributing to the overall GDP indicated by ܩܦ ூܲ.   
For the service sector, formula 3.4 reads 
ܹܮௌ ൌ ௌܶ ∗ ܩܦ ௌܲ          (3.4) 
Whereby ܹܮ஺ stands for the climate change winner and loser index for service per 
country comprised of the distance to the optimum cardinal temperature per GDP sector ௌܶ 
multiplied by the percentage of the service sector contributing to the overall GDP indicated by 
ܩܦ ௌܲ.   
The overall Winner-Loser ܹܮ் index was calculated per GDP sector leading the 
sector-specific Winner-Loser indices ܹܮ஺ for the agriculture sector, ܹܮூ for the industry 
sector, and ܹܮௌ for the service sector, that were then added up into the Winner-Loser total 
index ܹܮ் based on the following formula 3.5: 
ܹܮ் ൌ ܹܮ஺ ൅ܹܮூ ൅ܹܮௌ         (3.5) 
Whereby ܹܮ஺ denotes the Winner-Loser index for the agriculture sector, ܹܮூ the 
index for the industry sector and ܹܮௌ the index for the service sector.  All indices were 
calculated per country for the year 2100 business-as-usual projection.  To account for gain 
loss-prediction model differences, Puaschunder (2017) outlined three model variants over 
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gain and loss perspectives.  A linear model included gains and losses based on formula 3.6 
and 3.7: 
ܹ ൌ ܶଵ ∗ ܩܦܲ          (3.6) 
For the losers’ index ܮ a linear growth is assumed by calculated by formula 3.7 for 
each respective sector: 
ܮ ൌ െܶଵ ∗ ܩܦܲ          (3.7) 
per country and per GDP sector, which were then added up into the Winner-Loser total 
index ܹܮ் based on the formula 3.5. 
A prospect model included concave gains and convex losses based on formula 3.8 
and 3.9: 
ܹ ൌ ܶ଴.ହ ∗ ܩܦܲ          (3.8) 
For the losers’ index ܮ a linear growth is assumed by calculated by formula 3.9 for 
each respective sector: 
ܮ ൌ െܶଶ ∗ ܩܦܲ          (3.9) 
per country and per GDP sector, which were then added up into the Winner-Loser total 
index ܹܮ் based on the formula 3.5. 
A hyperbolic model included gains and losses based on formula 3.10 and 3.11: 
ܹ ൌ ܶଶ ∗ ܩܦܲ         
 (3.10) 
For the losers’ index ܮ a linear growth is assumed by calculated by formula 3.11 for 
each respective sector: 
ܮ ൌ െܶଶ ∗ ܩܦܲ         
 (3.11) 
per country and per GDP sector, which were then added up into the Winner-Loser total 
index ܹܮ் based on the formula 3.5. 
The overall Winner-Loser ܹ ܮ index was calculated per GDP sector leading the sector-
specific Winner-Loser indices ܹܮ஺ for the agriculture sector, ܹܮூ for the industry sector, and 
ܹܮௌ for the service sector, that were then added up into the Winner-Loser total index ܹܮ் 
based on formula 3.5.  The mean overall Winner-Loser ܹܮ index was retrieved from summing 
the ܹܮ் indices for the linear, prospect and hyperbolic models per country divided by ݊=3.   
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Overall, a positive ܹܮ index result would indicate a long distance to the optimum, 
whereas a negative index would be considered as negative prospect.  Basically the more 
positive the index, the longer time the country could expect to be having a favorable climate 
for agriculture, industries or service production until peak condition and the more negative the 
index, the sooner the country would (have) run out of efficiency time.  In sum, the Winner-
Loser index is an indicator how much cool time a country still has ahead in prospect of an 
optimum GDP productivity temperature and the assumption that the earth is warming.  For a 
detailed explanation of the ܹܮ் index creation please see Puaschunder (2017).  
3.2 Modelling climate change gains and losses distribution 
In order to estimate a fair climate change gains and losses distribution, first for each 
model variants the gains and losses were calculated (Puaschunder, 2017).   
3.2.1 Linear model 
When unidimensionally focusing on estimated GDP growth given a warmer 
temperature and estimating a linear growth of losses and wins, overall the world will be gaining 
more than losing until 2100.  Based on the ܹܮ index of 198 countries of the world and under 
the assumption of linear gains and losses in light of climate change, less countries (n=79) will 
win more from global warming until 2100 than more countries (n=119) will lose from a warming 
earth.  In particular, 79 countries of the world will gain ܹ ܮ௅=78139.08 in GDP output, whereas 
119 countries of the world will lose estimated ܹܮ௅=-52061. 
3.2.2 Prospect convex losses and concave gains model 
When unidimensionally focusing on estimated GDP growth given a warmer 
temperature and estimating an exponential growth of losses and concave wins, overall the 
world will be losing more than gaining until 2100.  Based on the ܹܮ index of 188 countries of 
the world, more countries (n=113) will lose more from global warming until 2100 than less 
countries (n=75) will win from a warming earth.  In particular, 75 countries of the world will gain 
ܹܮ௉=22717.161 in GDP output, whereas 113 countries of the world will lose estimated ܹ ܮ௉=-
353175.32. 
3.2.3 Hyperbolic model 
When unidimensionally focusing on estimated GDP growth given a warmer 
temperature and estimating a hyperbolic growth, overall the world will be gaining more than 
losing until 2100.  Based on the ܹܮ index of 188 countries of the world, less countries (n=79) 
will gain more from global warming until 2100 than more countries (n=109) will lose from a 
warming earth.  In particular, 79 countries of the world will gain ܹܮு=1037192 in GDP output, 
whereas 109 countries of the world will lose estimated ܹܮு=-352088. 
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3.2.4 Total estimate 
The total Winner-Loser ܹܮ index was calculated per country based on the mean of 
the overall Winner-Loser index ܹܮ௅ for the linear model, the overall Winner-Loser index ܹܮ௉ 
for the prospect model, and the overall Winner-Loser index ܹܮு for the hyperbolic model that 
were then added up into the Winner-Loser total index ܹܮ்் based on the following formula 
3.12: 
ܹܮ்் ൌ ሺܹܮ௅ ൅ܹܮ௉ ൅ܹܮுሻ/݊       
 (3.12) 
whereby ܹܮ௅ denotes the Winner-Loser index for the linear model, ܹܮ௉ the index for 
the prospect model and ܹܮு the index for the hyperbolic model and ݊ ൌ 3.  All indices were 
calculated per country for the year 2100 business-as-usual projection.   
3.3 Global warming winners and losers around the world 
When unidimensionally focusing on estimated GDP growth given a warmer 
temperature, over all calculated models assuming linear, prospect or hyperbolic gains and 
losses, the world will be gaining more than losing until 2100.  Based on the ܹܮ index of 188 
countries of the world, less countries (n=78) will gain more from global warming until 2100 
than more countries (n=111) will lose from a warming earth.  In particular, 78 countries of the 
world will gain ܹܮீ=354039,6345 in GDP output, whereas 111 countries of the world will lose 
estimated ܹܮ௅=-232613,188.   
Puaschunder (2017) investigated the relation between GDP growth prospects in light 
of climate change.  Based on the ܹܮ்் index, which measures the distance to cardinal 
temperature per GDP sector in 188 countries of the world, the world separates into climate 
change winners (n=77) and losers (n=111) are outlined in graph 1 (Puaschunder, 2017). 
Insert graph 1 about here 
Based on a country ranking, graph 1 highlights the top one-third countries with longest 
time prospect in green color and the one-third countries that have run out of time in red color.   
Based on a ܹܮ்் estimate, graph 2 highlights all world countries with highest gain 
perspective in green color and the one-third countries that lose the most in red color.   
Insert graph 2 about here 
Graph 3 shows only wins in Europe from climate change until the year 2100 based on 
the ܹܮ்் estimate.   
Insert graph 3 about here 
Graph 4 reveals only wins in North America from climate change until the year 2100 
based on the ܹܮ்் estimate.    
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Insert graph 4 about here 
The relation between GDP growth prospects in light of climate change and percentage 
of GHG for ratification was studied based on the total and percent of greenhouse gas 
emissions communicated by the Paris COP 21 Parties to the Convention retrieved in their 
national communications, GHG inventory reports as of December 2015 (Puaschunder, 
2017).9  Over a sample of 181 countries of the world, a highly significant correlation of 
ݎ௉௘௔௥௦௢௡(181) =.215, ݌<.004 between the ܹܮ index over all models and the self-reported 
percentage of GHG emissions for ratification was found.  As a cross-validation check, the 
percentage of GHG emissions for ratification was significantly positively correlated ݎ௉௘௔௥௦௢௡(181) 
=.178, ݌<.016 with self-reported GHG emissions per country (Puaschunder, 2017).   
This result leads to the conclusion that those countries that emit more GHG are the 
ones with a positive GDP prospect on the warming earth until 2100.  The more time countries 
seem to have in a favorable climate for production, the more they are also likely to emit GHG 
and hence contribute to global warming.  All these results outline the need for attention to 
climate justice.   
3.4 Fair climate change gains distribution 
In order to offset the losses from climate change based on the overall ܹܮ்் index, 
global warming benefits are redistributed in a fair way to offset climate change loser countries 
for climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts and to instigate a transition into renewable 
energy.   
To ensure a fair benefit transfer strategy, the difference of ∆ܹܮ=121426,447 should 
be distributed based on following criteria:  To ensure a fair benefit transfer strategy inbetween 
countries, the per-country contributions to alleviate the losses caused by global warming 
should only come from those countries that win from a warming earth, hence 78 nation states.  
The winning countries’ contribution in relation to the other winning countries’ contribution, 
hence as share of all wins, were be calculated based on the percentage of wins and losses 
based on the formula 3.13 and 3.14.   
In order to account for country differences in offsetting global warming through GDP 
growth (especially on the winners’ side) and the country differences in their ability to transfer 
into renewable energy, the overall GDP per inhabitant was factored into the transfer equation 
as outlined in formula 3.13:  
                                                 
9 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10.pdf#page=30 
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ܴௐ ൌ ቀ ௉ೈௐ௅ಸቁ ∗ ቀ
ீ஽௉೎
ூ೎ ቁ        
 (3.13) 
whereby ܴௐ denotes the total transfer of climate change wins obligation per winning 
country, ௐܲ is the country specific GDP win divided by all wins ܹܮீ=354039,6345 from a 
warming earth for the year 2100 business-as-usual projection in order to derive the percentage 
fraction of wins per country.  ܩܦ ஼ܲ equals the per country GDP estimate per inhabitant ܫ௖ per 
country for the year 2016.  
Losses were calculated based on formula 3.14:  
ܴ௅ ൌ ሺ ௉ಽ௉ಽ೅ሻ ∗ ቀ
ீ஽௉೎
ூ೎ ቁ         
 (3.14) 
whereby ܴ௅ denotes the total transfer of climate change compensation, ௅ܲ is the 
country specific GDP loss divided by all losses ܹܮ௅=-232613,188 from climate change for the 
year 2100 business-as-usual projection in order to derive the relative fraction of losses per 
country.  ܩܦ ஼ܲ equals the per country GDP estimate per inhabitant ܫ௖ per country for the year 
2016. 
The overall transfers ்ܴ equate with the sum of contributions from the countries 
benefiting from global warming and the losses incurred by the countries that lose from global 
warming until 2100.  Overall all transfers ்ܴ derive from ܴௐ and ܴ௅, which must be equal 
based on the following formula 3.15:  
்ܴ ൌ ܴௐ ൅ ܴ௅                    (3.15) 
whereby ்ܴ denotes the total transfer of wins for compensation of losses. 
3.5 Country contributions 
3.5.1 Climate change transfers 
Based on the ܹܮ்் index, which measures the distance to cardinal temperature per 
GDP sector in 188 countries of the world, all 77 climate change transfer grantor countries and 
109 climate change transfer beneficiary countries are outlined in graph 5. 
Insert graph 5 about here 
Graph 6 features the countries with most time to a favorable climate weighted by 
overall GDP and their overall transfer burden.  The top 19 transfer grantor countries are 
ܹܮ்்஻. Canada (ܹܮ்்஻=-7299.04), Russia (ܹܮ்்஻=-6999.3), Mongolia (ܹܮ்்஻=-5032.75), 
Kyrgyzstan (ܹܮ்்஻=-4154.31), Tajikistan (ܹܮ்்஻=-4089.42), Iceland ܹܮ்்஻=-3887.91), 
Finland (ܹܮ்்஻=-3798.36), Norway (ܹܮ்்஻=-3708.43), Sweden (ܹܮ்்஻=-3644.39), Latvia 
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(ܹܮ்்஻=-2465.58), Georgia (ܹܮ்்஻=-2452.19), North Korea (ܹܮ்்஻=-2428.53), 
Switzerland (ܹܮ்்஻=-2394.05), Estonia (ܹܮ்்஻=-2342.77), Liechtenstein (ܹܮ்்஻=-
2318.88), Lithuania (ܹܮ்்஻=-2188.99), Nepal (ܹܮ்்஻=-2131.26), Austria (ܹܮ்்஻=-
2103.02), Belarus (ܹܮ்்஻=-2077.12), and Kazakhstan (ܹܮ்்஻=-2039.07).  
Insert graph 6 about here 
All global warming transfer beneficiary countries are outlined in graph 7.  The major 
transfer beneficiaries are Qatar (ܹܮ்்=2911.69), Bahrain (ܹܮ்்=2793.87), Brunei 
(ܹܮ்்=2591.98), United Arab Emirates (ܹܮ்்=2446.67), Kiribati (ܹܮ்்=2370.55), 
Mauritania (ܹܮ்்=2311.14), Tuvalu (ܹܮ்்=2228.85), Djibouti (ܹܮ்்=2140.24), Senegal 
(ܹܮ்்=2091.74), Burkina Faso (ܹܮ்்=2009.04), Maldives (ܹܮ்்=2008.46), Trinidad and 
Tobago (ܹܮ்்=1997.28), Mali (ܹܮ்்=1922.99), Equatorial Guinea (ܹܮ்்=1875.88), Sri 
Lanka (ܹܮ்்=1855.24), Palau, (ܹܮ்்=1838.85), Seychelles (ܹܮ்்=1775.79), Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines (ܹܮ்்=1772.60), Samoa (ܹܮ்்=1760.75), and Guinea 
(ܹܮ்்=1753.07). 
Insert graph 7 about here 
Based on the ܹܮ்் index weighted per GDP and per inhabitant, which measures the 
distance to cardinal temperature per GDP sector in 186 countries of the world, all 76 climate 
change transfer grantor countries and 110 climate change transfer beneficiary countries are 
outlined in graph 8. 
Insert graph 8 about here 
Graph 9 features the highest grantor countries weighted by GDP and per inhabitant.  
The top 20 transfer grantor countries are Liechtenstein (ܹܮ்்஻=-10.34), Canada (ܹܮ்்஻=-
8.88), Norway (ܹܮ்்஻=-7.65), Iceland ܹܮ்்஻=-6.35), Switzerland (ܹܮ்்஻=-5.67), 
Luxembourg (ܹܮ்்஻=-5.52), Finland (ܹܮ்்஻=-3.77), Monaco (ܹܮ்்஻=-3.41), Denmark 
(ܹܮ்்஻=-3.19), Austria (ܹܮ்்஻=-3.03), United States (ܹܮ்்஻=-2.87), Ireland (ܹܮ்்஻=-
2.18), Germany (ܹܮ்்஻=-2.15), United Kingdom (ܹܮ்்஻=-1.80), Belgium (ܹܮ்்஻=-1.44), 
New Zealand (ܹܮ்்஻=-1.41), Estonia (ܹܮ்்஻=-1.38), France (ܹܮ்்஻=-1.18), Latvia 
(ܹܮ்்஻=-1.15), and Slovenia (ܹܮ்்஻=-1.15).  
Insert graph 9 about here 
All global warming transfer beneficiary countries are outlined in graph 10.  The major 
transfer beneficiaries are Qatar (ܹܮ்்=19.06), United Arab Emirates (ܹܮ்்=9.33), 
Singapore (ܹܮ்்=7.90), Brunei (ܹܮ்்=6.06), Bahrain (ܹܮ்்=5.90), Kuwait (ܹܮ்்=3.94), 
Trinidad and Tobago (ܹܮ்்=2.98), Saudi Arabia (ܹܮ்்=2.92), Mauritania (ܹܮ்்=2.51), 
Seychelles (ܹܮ்்=2.39), Equatorial Guinea (ܹܮ்்=2.29), Palau, (ܹܮ்்=2.27), Oman 
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(ܹܮ்்=2.00), Antigua and Barbuda (ܹܮ்்=1.99), Barbados (ܹܮ்்=1.70), Venezuela 
(ܹܮ்்=1.29), Saint Kitts and Nevis (ܹܮ்்=1.28), Panama (ܹܮ்்=1.27), Grenada 
(ܹܮ்்=1.26), and Malaysia (ܹܮ்்=1.24). 
Insert graph 10 about here 
Graph 11 provides an overview off all climate change winning transfer grantors in 
green and yellow colors and all climate change loser country transfer beneficiaries in pink and 
red colors. 
Insert graph 11 about here 
4. Discussion 
The implementation of climate stability accounts for the most challenging 
contemporary global governance predicament that seems to pit world countries but also 
today’s generation against future world inhabitants.  For enacting climate justice current world 
nation states of the current world population are called upon to make sacrifices today for future 
generations to cut carbon emissions to avert global warming (Sachs, 2014).  Climate change 
mitigation at the expense of lowered economic growth seems to pit the current generation 
against future ones.  Costly climate change abatement prospects are thus hindering currently 
necessary action on climate change given a shrinking time window prior to reaching tipping 
points that make global warming irreversible (Oppenheimer et al., 2011).   
In a trade-off of economic growth versus sustainability, a broad-based international 
coalition could establish climate stability.  As a novel angle towards climate justice, the 
attention to global warming gains and losses being distributed unequally around the globe 
allows proposing a well-balanced climate mitigation and adaptation public policy mix guided 
by micro- and macroeconomic analysis results.  This paper offers a new way of funding climate 
change mitigation and adaptation policies but also the transition to renewable energy through 
broad-based climate stability bonds-and-tax-transfer-mix that also involve future generations 
(World Bank, 2015).  Contemporary climate stability financing strategies are discussed in order 
to derive recommendations how market economies can be brought to a path consistent with 
prosperity and sustainability.  Finding innovative ways how to finance climate abatement over 
time coupled with future risk prevention as well as adaptation to higher temperatures appears 
as an innovative and easily-implementable solution to nudge overlapping generations towards 
climate justice in the sustainability domain (Rawls, 1971).  
Having shed light on the gains of a warming earth demands for the redistribution of 
climate change benefits to those areas of the world that will be losing from a warming earth.  
In the implementation, a climate change bonds but also taxation strategies are recommended. 
Having found that there are gains from a warming earth demands to partially transfer benefits 
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into areas of the world that will be primarily losing from climate change.  In order to avoid 
governmental expenditure on climate change hindering economic growth (Barro, 1990); the 
climate transfers should be enacted through bonds and taxes.    
First Jeffrey Sachs (2014) proposed an intergenerational burden sharing idea by 
presenting a 3-model climate change burden sharing through fiscal policy with bond issuing 
in order to reflect the implementation regarding contemporary finance and growth models with 
respect for maximizing utility of the model.  In an overlapping-generations type model, climate 
change abatement and mitigation policies financed through climate gains re-distribution could 
lead to a fairer solution across the globe and over generations.  Thereby the current generation 
mitigates climate change and provides infrastructure against climate risk financed through 
climate bonds to be paid by future generations.  Since for future generations the currently 
created externalities from economic activities – the effects of C02 emissions – are removed, 
this entails that the current generations remain financially as well off as without mitigation while 
improving environmental well-being of future generations.  As Sachs (2014) shows, this 
intergenerational tax-and-transfer policy turns climate change mitigation and adaptation policy 
into a Pareto improving strategy.  Shifting the costs for climate abatement to the recipients of 
the benefits of climate stability appears as novel, feasible and easily-implementable solution 
to nudge many overlapping generations towards future-oriented loss aversion in the 
sustainability domain (Puaschunder, 2016b).  
One of the most prominent forms to create revenues for public long-term investment 
causes are taxes. Taxation is codified in all major societies and a hallmark of democracy. 
Aimed at redistributing assets to provide public goods and ensure societal harmony, taxation 
improves societal welfare and fairness notions within society.  Tax compliance is a universal 
phenomenon based on cooperation in the wish for improving the social compound.  Taxpayers 
voluntarily decide to what extent to pay or avoid tax that limit the personal freedom.  In a social 
dilemma, individual interests are in conflict with collective goals.  From a myopic economic 
perspective, the optimal strategy of rational individuals would be to not cooperate and thus 
evade tax.  Short-term the single civilian tax contribution does not make a significant difference 
in the overall maintenance of public goods – if only a few taxpayers evade taxes, public goods 
will not disappear or be reduced.  If a considerable number of taxpayers do not contribute to 
tax over time, common goods are not guaranteed and ultimately everyone will suffer from 
suboptimal societal conditions (Dawes, 1980; Stroebe & Frey, 1982; Puaschunder, 2015b).  
Contemporary economic research has focused on costs and risks of tax evasion (Tyler & De 
Cremer, 2006).  Coercive means – such as audits and fines – were found to crowd out tax 
morale and ultimately result in greater non-compliance as people feel controlled and not being 
trusted (Cialdini, 1996; Feld & Frey, 2002; Frey, 1992; Hasseldine, 1998).  In the last decade, 
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researchers have started to recognize the importance of incorporating morals and social 
dynamics in economic theory on tax behavior (Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 1998).   When 
analyzing tax behavior, recently behavioral economics insights have drawn attention to social 
influences (Puaschunder, 2015b).  
Behavioral economists widen the lens of incorporating sociological and socio-
psychological notions of fairness stemming from social comparisons regarding tax burdens 
could be positive drivers of tax compliance to overcome the ‘burden of taxes’ and associations 
of losses.  The cases of voluntary, self-chosen tax ethics and situational influences on social 
tax compliance norms have just recently been covered by behavioral approaches towards 
public administration.  In general, social comparisons determine social norms that define 
internalized standards how to behave.  Yet internalized social norms are based on 
comparisons with others that may determine tax morale (Frey, 1997; Mumford, 2001; 
Schmölders, 1960).  Social norms elicit concurring behavior when taxpayers identify with the 
goals of a group but also if they feel being treated in a fair manner by that group.  Social 
fairness considerations in a tax reference group may further taxpayer compliance.  Fairness 
is believed to decrease egoistic utility maximization leveraging trust and reciprocity as 
interesting social norms building factors (Kirchler, 2007). Social perceptions of fairness as 
underlying social norms are therefore potential tax ethics nudges.  But psychological facets of 
fairness for the formation of social norms have been left out.  If taxpayers believe that non-
compliance is a widespread and socially-accepted, then it is more likely that they will not 
comply as well.  Non-compliance may stem from the notion of unfairness in how the tax burden 
is weighted heavier on some parts of society.    
The respective bonds-and-tax climate stability financing strategy therefore proposes 
to bear the burden of climate in a right, just and fair way around the globe.  In the climate 
change winner countries, taxation should become the main driver over financing climate 
stability strategies.  Foremost, the industries winning from a warming climate should be taxed.  
The Winner-Loser-index is based on the cardinal temperatures for all GDP contributing 
sectors.  Based on the cardinal temperatures for the three GDP components agriculture, 
industry and service, the taxation should be enacted for those sectors having most time ahead.  
The underlying rational is thereby that these sectors will be gaining the most from a warming 
earth and will therefore be flourishing.   
Regarding concrete climate taxation strategies, a carbon tax on top of the existing tax 
system should be used to reduce the burden of climate change and encourage economic 
growth through subsidies (Chancel & Piketty, 2015).  Within a country, high and low income 
households should face the same burden of climate stabilization adjusted for their disposable 
income.  First, climate justice within a country should pay tribute to the fact that low- and high 
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income households share the same burden proportional to their dispensable income, for 
instance enabled through a progressive carbon taxation.  Finding the optimum balance 
between consumption tax adjusted for disposable income through a progressive tax scheme 
will aid to unravel drivers of tax compliance in the sustainability domain.  Those who caused 
climate change could be regulated to bear a higher cost through carbon tax in combination 
with retroactive billing through inheritance tax.  But also developed and underdeveloped 
countries as well as various overlapping generations are affected differently.  Besides 
progressive taxation schemes to imbue a sense of fairness in climate change burden sharing, 
inheritance taxation is also a flexible means to reap past wealth accumulation, which 
potentially caused environmental damage.  The burden of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation could also be allocated in a fair way within society through contemporary 
inheritance tax in order to reap benefits of past wealth accumulation.   
If climate taxation is perceived as fair and just allocation of the climate burden, this 
could convince tax payers to pay one’s share.  A novel ‘service-and-client’ atmosphere could 
promote taxpayers as cooperative citizens who are willing to comply if they feel their share as 
fair contribution to the environment.  Taxpayers as cooperative citizens would then be willing 
to comply voluntarily following the greater goal to promote taxpayer collaboration and enhance 
tax morale in the environmental domain.  International comparisons of tax behavior also reveal 
tax norms being related to different stages of institutional development of the government, 
which is an essential consideration in sharing the climate change burden in a fair manner 
between countries.  A completely novel approach is to shed light on the benefits of a warming 
earth in order to derive fair climate gains distribution strategies around the world 
(Puaschunder, 2017). 
Introducing financing climate change mitigation through bonds to be paid back by 
future generations through taxation is an additional means to raise funds for offsetting the 
losses of global warming.  As a novel means to amend individual saving preferences in favor 
of future generations, Sachs (2014) proposes to mitigate climate change by debt to be repaid 
by tax revenues on labor income in the future.  In a 2-period model, one generation works in 
period 1 and retires in period 2.  Part of the disposable wage income is saved for consumption 
in the second period.  CO2 emission mitigation imposes immediate costs onto current 
generations and reduces wages.  Greenhouse gas concentrations in period 2 are determined 
by the emissions in period 1.  Wages of the young in the second period are reduced by climate 
change dependent on greenhouse gas levels.  Disposable labor income of the young equals 
market wage net of taxes.  Leaving the current generation with unchanged disposable income 
allocates the burdens of climate change mitigation across generations without the need to 
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trade off one generation’s well-being for another’s.  While today’s young generation is left 
unharmed, the second period young generation is made better off ecologically.   
The bonds solution should primarily be pursued in climate change loser countries, in 
order to offset the costs for climate change in a more intergenerationally harmonious way.  
Since there are no profiting entities and industries in the losing countries, future generations 
should be serving as last resort to pay for climate stability.  All generations are better off with 
mitigation through climate bonds as compared to the business-as-usual (BAU) non-mitigation 
scenario (Sachs, 2014).  While future generations enjoy a favorable climate and averted 
environmental lock-ins; the current populace does not face drawbacks on economic growth 
(Puaschunder, 2017).  Governments in loser countries should receive tax transfers in the 
present from the winning countries.  Since here borrowing equals loans or issuing of bonds to 
be paid back by future generations, the government must pay back debt plus interest 
payments by raising taxes on later generations.  This strategy is justified as for the assumed 
willingness of future generations to avoid higher costs of climate change prevention and 
environmental irreversible lock-ins.  Overall this tax-and-transfer mitigation policy is thus 
Pareto improving and overall fair solution across the world and generations.   
5. Conclusion 
As a novel alternative to raise funds to instigate climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, the results yield at funding today’s climate stabilization efforts through an 
international benefits transfer backed by climate bonds and carbon tax.  Sharing the costs of 
climate change aversion between countries and across generations appears as important 
strategy to instigate immediate climate change mitigation through incentivizing emission 
reduction and provide adaptation funding opportunities.   
While the proposed climate change benefits transfer strategy through bonds and 
taxation is a novel economically and socio-psychologically superior strategy to nudge people 
into action and real-world relevant emergent risk prevention means; we currently lack 
information on the concrete impact of financing climate change mitigation and adaptation as 
well as transition to renewable energy.  The concrete benefits a warming earth and 
interconnectedness with climate change losses in light of interdependencies and lurking 
tipping points are unknown, yet hold crucial insights on the model’s sustainability over time.   
Overall, the paper thereby provided the first attempt to find a behavioral economics 
solution to nudge people into necessary climate action based on positive incentives.  Positive 
signals of gain prospects may help engage the many we need for instigating action now on 
climate justice.  This novel, feasible and easily-implementable solution to steer many 
stakeholders towards climate action is only presented in order to help to derive mitigation 
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policies and communication strategies for a fairer climate stability solution.  All these 
endeavors may lead to a fairer strategy to respond to global warming and hopefully provide a 
real-world relevant means how to implement climate justice across the globe and over time.  
In deriving information on climate justice implementation and management strategies, 
future research should investigate what institutions and regimes could guide benefits 
distribution.  This information is essential in order to craft institutional climate justice 
management strategies and define feasible market structures to issue and policies to support 
climate justice on a global scale.  In addition, the fiscal sustainability of climate justice 
distribution over time should be evaluated in order to estimate real-world relevant climate 
change mitigation and adaptation market strategies in the finance sector based on future 
global climate prospects.  In this line of research, a more nuanced investigation should follow 
on what sector-specific gains are expected to flourish as well as what GDP sectors will likely 
see growth and which ones will likely see a reduction due to changing climate conditions.  
Further, climate instigated migration should become prospected based on the findings of 
global climate change winners and losers as well as prospective findings of sector and industry 
specific climate change-induced growth.  Further insights gained could lead to mapping 
climate induced migration streams and a climate refugee asylum strategy in countries winning 
from a warming earth.  These insights on climate-induced migration could become the 
backbone of acknowledging climate refugees under the Geneva Convention (Ferreira, 
forthcoming).  
The preliminary findings of beneficial climate change is aimed at paving the way to 
more solid investigations on the optimal policy mix to combat climate change financed through 
the distribution of global warming benefits.  The established fact of short-term benefits of 
climate change should thereby orchestrate the financialization of climate stability.  Climate 
change mitigation and adaptation infrastructure should be derived from balancing the global 
warming gains around the globe and over time.  Future research endeavors should help 
multiple stakeholders shape economic growth with respect for sustainable development on 
the basis of climate change burden sharing through global warming benefit transfers enacted 
through bonds and taxation inbetween countries and inbetween generations.  All these 
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Graph 11: World climate change benefit transfers, green=highest benefit transfer countries, yellow=medium benefit transfer countries, light 
red=medium beneficiary countries, red=highest beneficiary countries 
 
 
